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Introduction
Those who wish to determine empirically whether
overseas aid has improved the standard of life in
developing countries are quickly confronted with a
paradox. The microeconomic data from evaluations
of aid-financed projects are encouraging: all donors
who calculated ex-post rates of return on their projects
reveal a large preponderance of successful projects.
The World Bank, the largest development agency,
reports average ex-post rates of return of over 10 per
cent in every continent and every economic sector over
the 20 year period 1961-81.'
Yet the macroeconomic data, from regressions of aid
on growth across a cross-section of developing
countries, are discouraging. When other determinants
of growth, such as savings rates and export growth, are
held constant, we cannot confirm, for any continent or
either decade, the significant and positive relationship
between aid and growth in recipient countries which
the microeconomic data might suggest. Table 1 also
shows that the micro and the macro results from Asia
are consistently more encouraging than the results
from Africa.
What is going on? Is it true, as the data suggest, that
aid projects are succeeding while aid as a whole is
failing, and if so how? Or do the data in fact deceive?
The Logical Causes of 'Macro-Micro Slippage'
There are at least three logically possible reasons why
macro and micro data on aid-effectiveness may tell a
different story:
(j) Inaccuracies in the data
Estimates of the ex-post rate of return on projects
frequently depend on guesstimates of a high order of
'World Bank (1983) Table 6. Figures for the 1970s. taken
individually, are less good; see World Bank, Tenth Annua!Review of
Project Performance Audit Reports (August 1984), vol. 1, page 24.
Also, failure rates were high in some regions and sub-sectors; see
page 25 of the same volume.
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magnitude. Most aid-financed development projects
of which I have experience lack monitoring systems
good enough to tell us accurately what increased
outputs were caused by the project and what price they
were sold at, let alone to give us useful measures of the
shadow prices of inputs and outputs.2
However, it would be a mistake to turn with relief
from messy project data to 'authoritative' data on the
growth of GNP. The latter often lack any rigorous
basis of estimation, particularly in the poorer
countries, where we are most interested in the impact
of aid, but where the enormous relative size of the
non-monetary sector makes any objective measure-
ment of economic growth very difficult.3 For an
immediate illustration of the arbitrariness to which
these deficiencies can lead, turn to the appendix table
on page 187 of the original Berg Report, where the
growth of the Upper Volta economy in the 1960s is
given as 0.7 per cent according to UNCTAD data, but
as 3.9 per cent according to French Government data;
in sub-Saharan African countries overall, the highest
available estimate of GNP growth for the decade is
more than twice the lowest available estimate [World
Bank 1981, unnumbered Table p.187]. In short, both
the micro and macro data are seriously defective; as a
consequence, either the 'pessimistic' macro-based
view of aid or the 'optimistic' micro-based view
advanced in our introduction may be wrong for this
reason alone.
2 For example, very few project monitoring systems conduct surveys
on 'control groups' in order to determine what proportion of
changes in target variables was due to the project, and what
proportion was due to extraneous factors such as weather and crop
prices.
Measures of the output of the non-monetary sector invariably
depend on sample surveys of food, clothing, etc., for domestic
consumption based on a very small sample of the population; and
the pricing of this output is arbitrary, since the figure which
statisticians need, namely the price which non-monetary output
would fetch if instead of being consumed it were sold on the free
market, is hypothetical.
Table 1
Macro and Micro Indicators of Aid-effectiveness, 1960-80
(ii) Possible Biases in Project Data
First, there is a problem of sampling bias: we simply
do not have feedback on the performance of all, or
even a large random sample, of aid-financed projects.
The World Bank, from which the 'optimistic' view of
project performance is largely derived, is the only
development agency which tries to measure ex-post
rate of return on most of its projects, but the Bank only
accounts for some 20 per cent of annual project aid
disbursements by value within the OECD aid-giving
community.4 The other 80 per cent of projects may
boast higher or lower rates of return than the Bank's;
we simply do not know.
Second, the rate of return figures which we do have are
computed at an arbitrary termination date, usually
just after the date at which aid money was withdrawn.5
Yet all readers will know of projects, most of whose
benefits materialised long after this date. There are
also projects whose detrimental effects came to be seen
World Bank (1984), introductory tables. This proportion rises if
allowance is made for projects which the Bank co-finances with
other donors.
World Bank Project Completion Reports, see for example World
Bank (1983), are usually done about six months after the end of
disbursement; full-scale Project Performance Audits are done a few
months after this. There are occasional exceptions to this practice:
some evaluations are done just before, and a few many years after,
the cessation of disbursements. For more details on the timing of
evaluation see Mosley (1983).
Source: Columns 1 and 2: Mosley, Hudson and Horrell (1986) Table 4. Sample comprises all less developed countries listed in
appendix tables of World Bank World Development Report; other variables in regression set are non-concessional capital
inflows, growth of exports, growth of literacy. Aid is grant equivalent of gross ODA (using a discount rate of 10 per cent)
and is lagged according to the estimated gestation periods of World Bank loans to developing countries. For more details
of method of calculation, see Mosley, Hudson and Horrell (1986) appendix 1.
Column 3: World Bank (1983) Table 6.
Symbols: *signiflcance at 5 per Cent level.
only after the donor had decamped.6 The introduction
to this Bulletin presents alarming reports of such Bank
projects in Africa.
Finally, project aid has occupied a declining share of
disbursements since the 1970s. As a rule, it is only
project aid whose impact is evaluated quantitatively
ex-post. Hence, even if the ex-post rate of return data
on projects could be made 100 per cent accurate, they
would represent the return on a sample of aid activities
over a proportion of their life-span, and hence could
not give a full picture of 'aid-effectiveness'. We do not,
of course, know whether the apparent return on all aid
projects and programmes (weighted by the cost of
each) would be increased or decreased, if all these
factors were allowed for.
(iii) Macro Effects which Rate of Return Formulae do
not try to Measure
The rate of return formula tries to measure what an
aid-based project achieved in its own right, not what
happened to the entire economy as a consequence of
6 As examples of the former effect consider forestry and soil
conservation projects, which yield their benefits over many
generations; as example of the latter, consider rural roads which
collapse just after ex-post evaluation. The World Bank has
instituted a series of 'impact evaluations' whose intention is to
measure these long-term effects. It has also published a study of the
sustainability of projects after the termination of aid agreements;
for details see World Bank (1985).
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1960-70 1970-80 (sample size) 1961-81
AREA
Africa south of Sahara 0.04 ._0.20* 28 14.5
East and South Asia 0.099 1.35* 18 21.9
Latin America and Caribbean 0.07 1.01 21 15.8
All developing countries 0.04 0.024 67 17.3
Partial regression Average ex post
coefficient of aid on rate of return
growth of GNP on World Bank
financed projects
the aid. There are two issues at stake here. First, there
is the question of what happens to the spending pattern
of the public sector. If the Ethiopian Government
receives free food aid as famine relief, then to the
extent that it would have bought food on the open
market in the absence of overseas aid, the aid releases
resources which can be used for any purpose:
development expenditure, military expenditure, re-
ducing taxes, reducing borrowing, etc. This is the
famous problem of 'fungibility'. Secondly, aid
disbursements affect relative prices and hence the
economic behaviour of the private sector. An example
is food aid, which in the short term relieves starvation
but in the long term brings down the domestic price of
food and thus the incentive for local farmers to supply
the home market. But there are less dramatic cases on
both the credit and debit side of the balance sheet, as
when aid supplies electric power which pulls down the
real price of energy throughout the economy, or when
aid causes a minor boom in a remote rural area which
pushes up the price of transport, unskilled labour and
so on to the entire private sector in that region.
We may attempt to summarise the argument so far by
means of Fig. 1, which divides the effects of aid into
direct effects, indirect effects on public-sector
behaviour, and indirect effects on private-sector
behaviour. Measured ex-post rate of return data do
not attempt to measure the last two of these, and may
not satisfactorily capture the first if all data are
inaccurate or do not last over the entire duration of the
project. As regards the third effect - indirect effects of
aid on private-sector behaviour - a regression of aid
inflows on private sector investment suggests a strong
and significant 'crowding-out' effect in the l960s, but
that the effect became insignificant in the 1970s.7
Fig. l,with Table 1, provides a possible explanation of
the change in the overall regression coefficient of aid
on growth of GNP from negative to near-zero between
the 1960s and the 1970s. However, if we confine our
attention to the l970s, the neutral impact of aid on the
private sector is not sufficient to bridge the gap
between the highly satisfactory ex-post rates of return
on projects and the absence of relationship between
aid and growth at the macro level. The explanation of
the difference must therefore, by our previous
analysis, rest either with unrepresentative data about
ex-post rates of return, or with the problem of
'fungibility', viz. (since private investment was
The regression coefficient of aid inflows on private-sector capital
investment (domestic and foreign, including subsistence sector) was
measured as:
- 1.84(1 = 3.83) for 1960-70
-0.10 (t = 0.86) for 1970-80
by ordinary least squares against the sample of countries provided
by appendix tables of successive World Development Reports. For
further details see Mosley, Hudson and Horrell (1986, Table 5).
24
Fig. I
Channels through which Government-to-Government
Aid Inflows may affect Recipient Economy
1. 'Direct effects'
Injection
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Atters income as
direct consequence
of project
Alters relative prices
facing private sector
'Indirect effects' on public
sector of developing country
Releases equivalent
value of resources
in public sector.
These may be used for:
Cuts in
taxation
Cuts in
' borrowing
Increases in
'development'
expenditures
Increases in
'non-development'
expenditures
'Indirect effects' on private
sector of developing country
apparently not 'crowded out by aid in the 1970s) the
substitution of public-sector investment by aid
inflows. We have no data at the cross-country level
which will give us a handle on the relative importance
of these two factors, so let us now consider the
relationship between macro and micro measures of
aid-effectiveness at the level of one country, Kenya.
Country-Level Analysis: Kenya
If we examine Kenyan data for the 1960s and 1970s we
find that the 'macro-micro paradox' repeats itself at
the country level. There is no significant relationship,
positive or negative, between aid inflows measured as
a percentage of GNP and the growth of the Kenyan
economy over l966-82. However, World Bank
'The statistical relationship between the two variables is: Growth
rate of GDP = 6.5 + 0.013 (aid inflow as a percentage of GNP, 0.078)
unlagged, r2 = 0.1581.
projects in Kenya over the period show respectable, if
declining, rates of return.9
The response of most donors to the decline has been to
try to offset a presumed constraint in absorptive
capacity in the public sector, partly by disbursing
more aid in programme rather than in project form,'°
partly by disbursing more aid through the private
rather than the public sector,U and finally by applying
conditionality to the aid which continues to go
through the public sector. 12 All of these measures are
intended to 'raise the effectiveness of aid', ¡e to raise
the yield on projects. This they may do, but It is the
central argument of this paper that a high measured
rate of return on projects is perfectly consistent with a
low effectiveness of aid overall. We have identified two
possible channels through which this may occur,
namely displacement of productive private-sector
activities and productive public-sector activities by
aid.
The extent of these two 'leakages' is hard to measure
statistically, but there is much suggestive evidence
concerning the former. Fertiliser aid provided by
USAID has remained in the warehouse whilst
American aid staff bargained with the Kenya Treasury
over the price at which it was to be sold to farmers,
with the result that many small farmers were unable to
buy any fertiliser at all to put on the 1983 long rains
crop. 13 Integrated rural development projects in
remote areas such as Turkana and Isiolo have pushed
up the cost of transport and handling materials in
those areas. Source-tying of aid by the multiplicity of
different donors who currently exist in Kenya has
created a situation in which the country's water
engineers have to deal with 18 different makes of water
pump, with enormous costs in terms of training and of
diseconomies of small scale. And, finally, each donor
operates its own procedure for the reimbursement of
3Average ex-post rates of return on World Bank projects in Kenya
have been as follows in recent years:
Projects ending Average rate of return (unweighted)
1976 22
1977 16
1978 14
1980 19
1982 lO
1983 II
1984 12
Source: World Bank, Annual Reviews of Project Programme
Performance Audit Results, various.
'° For the United States the proportion has risen from 32 to 49 per cent
between 1972 and 1983, and for the UK from 16 to 26 per cent.
"in particular the United States [see USAID, Annual Budget
Submission, Fiscal Year 1985:Kenyal but also Britain and Holland.
12 Above all this conditionality has been attached to the World Bank's
Structural Adjustment Loans, or large scale programme loans. This
is discussed in Mosley (1985).
' For the detailed story of the episode see Mosley (1986).
money spent in Kenya under aid agreements, a
complication which in recent years has led to delays in
many aid-financed projects.
Manifestly, not all the side-effects of aid in the Kenya
private sector are negative. But negative side-effects
exist, and if they were done away with, the overall
productivity of aid would surely rise. In the last two of
the four cases above, the costs inflated by aid flow not
from its disbursement as such, but rather from its
supply by many competing donors. This creates a
presumption in favour of coordinating aid disburse-
ment to particular sectors to the fullest possible extent.
What of public-sector 'fungibility' - replacement of
productive state expenditures by aid? The larger the
share of the development budget which is financed by
aid, the smaller is the scope for switching. In countries
such as Bangladesh, Somalia or Nepal, where virtually
the whole of the development budget is paid for by
donors, there is little scope for switching: where the
government uses its entire income for recurrent
services and is too poor to budget any money for
development activities, there is nothing for aid to drive
out. In Kenya the share of aid in the total development
budget averages 45 per cent over the last 10 years
(although the figure has gone up very sharply in the
recent recession). The 55 per cent of development
spending financed from local sources has been
vulnerable to being switched into unproductive
expenditure, reduction of borrowing and reductions
of taxation, if the Kenya Government so chose.
Does this happen? One comprehensive study of aid to
Kenya has argued that the government has not
responded to extra aid by switching its own outlays
away from economically useful (and towards merely
political) activity. However, this depends more upon
assertion (and upon the Kenya economy's generally
good growth record) rather than upon factual analysis
of expenditure switching. This, in fact, is enormously
difficult to conduct, since it requires a comparison
between the observed pattern of spending in a given
period and the purely hypothetical pattern which
would have been observed in the absence of aid.
However, ifa decline in tax effort or an increase in the
ratio of recurrent expenditure to national income
regularly accompanies an increase in the share of aid
inflows to national income, then that indicates that
some aid is leaking into tax cuts or increase in the
recurrent budget, particularly if the share of
development expenditure in national income is not
rising at the same time. Fig. 2 is inconclusive for the
period from 1966, but after 1978 it shows aid
disbursements rising sharply, government development
expenditure static, and government recurrent
expenditure'4 rising sharply. This suggests that in the
All variables measured as percentage of GNP.
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Fig. 2
Kenya: Aid, Taxation and Public Spending, 1966-1984
Named category of
expenditure on taxation
z as percen tage of
GNP
to
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recent recession, at least, not all overseas aid was used
for its ostensible purpose of supporting development
expenditure and that some of the aid leaked through
into the recurrent budget. There is no trace of
declining tax effort, nor therefore of leakage into tax
reductions.
In short, some evidence suggests that the difference
between micro- and macro indicators of aid-
effectiveness in Kenya may in part be accounted for by
harmful side-effects of aid in the private sector and by
leakage into the recurrent budget;'5 but the evidence
for this explanation of the 'paradox' is much weaker
than we would wish.
° There is a counter-argument, which is that the Kenya government's
explicit strategy of protecting the recurrent budget through the
recession and letting the development budget go hang may in fact be
the best way of sustaining current growth - even if possibly at the
expense of future growth. Allocating aid to the maintenance of
existing roads may do more for current growth rates than allocating
it to the construction of new ones.
Government
recurrent expenditure
ax percentage of
GNP
Taxvenuo
of GNP
Government development
expenditure as
percentage of
GNP
Conclusions
There is a sharp discrepancy between macro- and
micro-level measures of the effectiveness of overseas
aid. Many operations have been conducted which are
successful in their own (rate of return) terms, but if the
patient has not died there is a lack of evidence that aid
inflows are making him any better. The pessimistic
macro-results must be interpreted with extreme
caution - in particular, aid works with a lag, and
there is a link running from economic crisis to aid by
donors in the following period, as well as the link
currently under investigation from aid in one period to
economic development in the next. But even when
these sources of bias have been removed it is not
possible to demonstrate that aid inflows account in
any statistically significant sense for the variance
between those Third World countries which are
growing rapidly and those which are not.16
On the simultaneous-causation argument see Papanek (1972) and
for an attempt to deal with the problem by means of two stage least
squares analysis see Mosley, Hudson and Horrell (1986:25).
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As Hirschman has reminded us, there are three
possible responses towards an institution which is not
performing as well as it should [Hirschman 19701.
There is no evidence, in our view, to justify 'exit' from
the international aid process: even at the macro-level
there is no statistical support for the arguments of
Bauer (1965) and Griffin (1970) that it actually
impoverishes, and at the micro-level there is ample
evidence that it does good in individual countries and
sectors. But by the same token there is little evidence to
justify blind 'loyality', for example, in the shape of a
pressure for higher levels of aid without regard to its
destination or effectiveness. This leaves 'voice', or
efforts towards reform.
But in what direction should the efforts be made? As
we saw earlier, there are two pathways (apart from
simple errors in measurement) which may cause the
overall effect of aid to diverge from the effect of
individual projects; these are 'switching' of aid money
within categories of public expenditure and side-
effects on the private sector. Currently the World
Bank and the OECD aid community, not quite
unanimously, are trying to deal with the second
problem by giving more money direct to the private
sector, and with the first by conditional programme or
sector aid designed to raise the quality of the entire
public investment programme rather than the rate of
return on individual projects.
There is nothing wrong with the general approach. But
it may not go very far, because conditions, like aid
itself, are fungible. Just as there is a risk that in some
countries, aid is paying for what the government
would have done in any case, so there is an equivalent
risk that in other countries, 'policy dialogue' may
merely seem to persuade governments to implement
policy reforms which they would have carried out in
any case [see Mosley 19851.
A better approach to 'aid-effectiveness' might be to
give more aid to countries - or perhaps regions -
which use it well and less to regions which use it badly,
on the grounds that the latter are leopards which no
conditional aid will ever persuade to change their
spots. For example, Table 1 suggests that Asian
developing countries, on both micro and macro
criteria, have over the last 20 years used aid more
effectively than African countries. There is little doubt
that if donor agencies were to redirect a good deal of
their aid from Africa to Asia in the 1980s, it would
become more effective. 7 Likewise, within countries,
they could increase effectiveness by switching aid from
This, of course, is to over-generalise: there are Asian Countries
which exhibit all the problems of aid ineffectiveness commonly
found in Africa (eg Nepal, Cambodia and to a lesser extent the
Philippines) just as there are exemplary aid recipients in Africa (cg
Malawi, Botswana and until recently the Ivory Coast).
sectors and sub-sectors which are going badly to
sectors of the economy which have a track record of
absorbing aid well.18 But that would represent the
triumph of experience over hope; and in the past it is
hope, not to mention faith, charity and material
interests, which more than 'effectiveness' have
motivated the allocation of overseas aid money.
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